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Imagine that you are on death row, and imagine that the in-
competence of your lawyer has put you there. A witness at your
trial testified that you waited at the wheel of a getaway car while
two accomplices robbed a liquor store and one of them shot and
killed the clerk. Shortly after your arrest, the prosecutor offered
to permit you and your co-defendants to plead guilty to voluntary
manslaughter and armed robbery. This offer would have limited
your sentence to 25 years.' Your co-defendants, including the al-
leged triggerman, accepted the offer. You would have accepted the
offer too if your lawyer had told you about it, but he never did.
* Julius Kreeger Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Emeritus, the Univer-
sity of Chicago.
1. Sandra Lockett turned down an offer like this one before being convicted and sen-
tenced to death. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 591 (1978).
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I. Two ASTONISHING THINGS ABOUT LAFLER AND FRYE: THE
DISSENTING AND MAJORITY OPINIONS
Two things astonish me about the decisions in Lafler v. Cooper'
and Missouri v. Frye.3 The first is that four justices of the United
States Supreme Court would allow your lawyer's incompetence to
kill you. These justices appear incredulous that anyone might
think you were treated unfairly.
One of these dissenting justices, Justice Scalia, proclaims that
you "received the exorbitant gold standard of American justice-a
full-dress criminal trial."' He argues that the people who object to
your execution "embraceH] the sporting-chance theory of criminal
law, in which the State functions as a conscientious casino-
operator, giving each player a fair chance to beat the house, that
is, to serve less time than the law says he deserves."'
In Justice Scalia's view, you'll get what you deserve while your
co-defendants just got lucky. Never mind that the prosecutor ini-
tially acknowledged that public justice did not require your execu-
tion; never mind that, through no fault of your own, you did not
get the sentence the American legal system considers normal for
offenders like you; and never mind that, despite the Constitution's
promise of the assistance of counsel, it was your lawyer who did
you in. In the American legal system, you got the gold.
When defense lawyers have slept through their trials, courts
have noted that a sleeping lawyer is the equivalent of no lawyer at
all.' Your lawyer, however, was worse than no lawyer at all.
Without him, the prosecutor would have made his offer directly to
you, and you would not be on death row. The state licenses law-
yers so that people like you can rely on them, but if Justice Ken-
nedy, the second most powerful man in America, had voted the
other way, the Court would allow your execution.
2. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
3. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
4. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. Id. Justice Thomas joined the portion of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion that
includes this rhetoric. Chief Justice Roberts joined an earlier portion that made the same
point less flamboyantly: "The defendant has been fairly tried, lawfully convicted, and
properly sentenced, and any 'remedy' provided for this will do nothing but undo the just
results of a fair adversarial process." Id. at 1397. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice
Alito declared, "Respondent received a trial that was free of any identified constitutional
error, and, as a result, there is no basis for concluding that respondent suffered prejudice
.... " Id. at 1398 (Alito, J., dissenting).
6. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Javor v. United
States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984).
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Stephanos Bibas describes the division between the majority
and dissenting opinions as "a jurisprudential one rooted in biog-
raphy and outlook."7 Justice Scalia, he says, "approaches matters
as an originalist . . . , regulating the eighteenth-century world of
the Framers."'
In fact, nothing at all seems "originalist" about Justice Scalia's
position. Substituting a regime of plea bargaining for the regime
of jury trials ostensibly safeguarded by the Constitution would
have appalled the authors of that document.' The courts of their
era strongly discouraged guilty pleas and held confessions induced
by promises of leniency involuntary.10
Even if one can imagine that the Framers would have counte-
nanced a regime of plea bargaining, it is difficult to believe they
would have withheld a right to the assistance of counsel in the
process that superseded the one they knew." Like all the other
justices of the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia genuflects before the
perceived necessity of plea bargaining.12 There are no originalists
there."
The second thing that astonishes me about Lafler and Frye is
that the remaining five justices of the Supreme Court might also
leave you on death row. While acknowledging that your constitu-
tional rights were violated, they would allow the judge who tried
and sentenced you to do nothing about it. The majority declares
that the "correct" remedy in cases like yours
7. Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 35, 38 (2012).
8. Id.
9. The Constitution declares that "[tihe Trial of all Crimes . .. shall be by Jury . . .,"
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. As John
Langbein notes, Americans now can replace the word "all" in these provisions with the
words "virtually none." See John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The
Disappearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 119, 119-20 (1992).
10. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-
13 (1979).
11. The defendants in Lafler and Frye had the assistance of counsel at trial, but the
lack of effective legal assistance kept them from obtaining the benefits of America's "real"
legal system. I doubt that the Framers would have cheered.
12. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In the United
States, we have plea bargaining a-plenty, but until today it has been regarded as a neces-
sary evil.").
13. Cf Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 501-11 (2009) (noting that justices who criticize the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule because it was unknown to the Framers have restricted the remedies that
were known to the Framers in ways they never would have approved).
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is to order the State to reoffer the plea agreement. Presuming
the respondent accepts the offer, the state trial court can then
exercise its discretion in determining whether to vacate the
conviction[I and resentence respondent pursuant to the plea
agreement . .. or to leave the convictionI and sentence from
trial undisturbed. 14
Notice that the issue is not whether the court would have ac-
cepted your guilty plea and sentenced you in accordance with the
agreement if your lawyer had been competent. It is whether sen-
tencing you in accordance with the agreement feels like a good
idea today.
The usual goal of legal remedies is to place the victim of a wrong
in the position he would have occupied had the wrong not oc-
curred, and doubts about what position he would have occupied
usually are resolved against the wrongdoer. For example, before a
constitutional trial error can be treated as harmless, the state
usually must demonstrate "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.""
When the Supreme Court wishes to disregard this principle,
however, it reshapes the constitutional right. You may believe, for
example, that you have a right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel, but the Supreme Court says you don't. You have only a right
to counsel whose ineffectiveness does not undermine confidence in
the outcome of your trial. To establish a violation of this right,
you must show not only that your "counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment" but also that your counsel's "deficient per-
formance prejudiced the defense" by depriving you of "a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable."" With the Sixth Amendment
right reconfigured in this way, the state need not show that your
lawyer's inadequate performance was harmless. You must show
that it wasn't.
This standard has been in place for nearly thirty years. Frye
says that it requires you to demonstrate not only your lawyer's
defective performance but also a "reasonable probability" of two
additional things-first, that you would have accepted the prose-
cutor's offer if your lawyer had told you about it and, second, that
14. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.
15. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
16. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
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the court would have approved the deal." Those requirements
come as no surprise, but satisfying them may not get you off death
row. Satisfying these requirements will merely establish a viola-
tion of your right to counsel. Lafler then leaves the question of
remedy to the trial judge's discretion. He may restore you to the
position you would have occupied if your lawyer had been compe-
tent, or he may not.18
17. 132 S. Ct. at 1409.
18. The Supreme Court apparently declined to order implementation of the sentence a
capable lawyer would have obtained for you because the evidence presented at your trial
might have shown that this sentence was too lenient. For example, an accomplice might
have testified that you proposed robbing the liquor store, supplied the firearms, and in-
structed your confederates to leave no witness alive. The prosecutor might have been una-
ware of your accomplice's allegations when he made his offer, and the judge might have
been convinced by the accomplice's testimony.
When a legal system is so indifferent to the truth that it bribes defendants not to
contest the prosecutor's evidence or present any evidence of their own, it seems odd to insist
that sentencing judges must be able to consider every circumstance that has emerged as a
result of violating a defendant's rights. In many cases each day, courts impose sentences
pursuant to plea agreements that they might have considered too lenient had they exam-
ined the evidence, and if the truth later emerges, the defendants' sentences remain final.
Should your case be different simply because you had an inadequate lawyer?
The Supreme Court majority apparently answers this question yes, and perhaps
you would have received a clearly undeserved break had your lawyer done his job. Even so,
the Court might have hesitated before substituting a regime of judicial discretion for the
customary (if sometimes too generous) remedial principle.
When the sentence a judge has imposed after a trial differs from the sentence the
prosecutor offered before trial, the judge is likely to consider the sentence he imposed more
appropriate. Is the judge's conclusion that the pretrial offer would constitute inadequate
punishment a sufficient reason for him to deny a remedy? Could he deny a remedy for this
reason in every case, thereby nullifying the rulings in Lafler and Frye? Or must the judge
conclude that the sentence offered by the prosecutor was grossly inappropriate or flagrantly
unjust? Must the judge find that the prosecutor was unaware of a relevant circumstance at
the time he made his offer? (It probably would not be difficult for a judge who has conduct-
ed a trial and examined a presentence investigation report to make such a finding.) What
if the judge exercised his discretion on a different basis-concluding, for example, that he
should give the defendant only the benefit of whatever portion of the prosecutor's offer was
"driven by fairness concerns"? See Wesley M. Oliver, The Indirect Potential of Lafler and
Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 640-41, 645 (2013).
A defendant denied a remedy would be likely to allege an abuse of the judge's dis-
cretion on appeal. In a legal system too miserly to implement the defendant's right to trial,
does devoting significant resources to delineating the boundaries of a judge's discretion not
to remedy a constitutional violation make sense? Are the many issues posed by the Lafler-
Frye ruling on remedies worth resolving? Recall that a court will consider these issues only
after a defendant has shown that his lawyer was inadequate, that he would have accepted
the prosecutor's offer, and that a court would have approved the agreement. See generally
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Effective Remedies for Ineffective Assistance, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript on file with author).
In Burt v. Titlow, 2013 WL 656043 (Feb. 25, 2013) (order granting certiorari), the
Supreme Court will consider what remedy, if any, to provide when a lawyer's ineffective
assistance led a defendant to withdraw from an agreement that would have required her to
testify against an alleged accomplice. Following the lawyer's ineffective assistance, the
purported accomplice was tried and acquitted without the defendant's testimony, and the
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II. LOOKING FOR LANDMARKS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES
Those are the things I find remarkable about Lafler and Frye,
but I am a pessimist who sees the glass as nine-tenths empty.
More cheery people observe that the glass is one-tenth full. In-
deed, in a heartwarming demonstration of the will to believe, some
claim that Lafler and Frye will be remembered as landmarks.
Wesley Oliver, for example, told the New York Times, "The Su-
preme Court's decisions in these two cases constitute the single
greatest revolution in the criminal justice process since Gideon v.
Wainwright provided indigents the right to counsel."" Stephanos
Bibas wrote, "After four decades of neglecting laissez-faire plea
bargaining, the Supreme Court got it right .... Finally, the Court
has brought law to the shadowy plea-bargaining bazaar."20
Ronald Wright told the Times, "I can't think of another decision
that's had any bigger impact than these two are going to have over
the next three years." Wright observed that, although plea bar-
gaining has been the rule rather than the exception for genera-
tions, "the Supreme Court has, until the last two or three years,
found a way to ignore that." The Court is like "Rip Van Winkle
waking up. He looks around and says, 'Wow, when I went to sleep
the world was full of trials."'21 Others have used words like "bold,"
"huge,"22 and "game-changing."23 They have declared, "With the
defendant herself was tried, convicted, and sentenced to a term of twenty-to-forty years
(rather than the seven-to-fifteen years she would have received under the abandoned
agreement). The government argues that, because it cannot be restored to the position it
would have occupied had the agreement been fulfilled, the defendant should not be restored
to the position she would have occupied either. See Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577 (6th Cir.
2012).
Whenever ineffective legal assistance leads to an unnecessary post-trial penalty (as
in Lafler and Frye themselves), the defendant cannot give the government what it bar-
gained for. He can no longer save the government the cost of a trial. The fact that the
defendant, through no fault of his own, cannot fulfill his part of the bargain provides no
reason to deny him a remedy. The Constitution promised him effective legal assistance,
and when his attorney failed to provide it, it was the government that defaulted on a core
promise. Like the defendant, the prosecutor's office might have been blameless. It is nev-
ertheless appropriate for the government rather than the defendant to bear the conse-
quences of a governmental default by restoring the defendant to the position he would have
occupied had the constitutional promise been fulfilled.
19. Adam Liptak, Justices Expand Rights of Accused in Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2012, at Al; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. Bibas, supra note 7, at 35.
21. Erika Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the "Bazaar" of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES,




... decisions in Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, a new era in
the jurisprudence of the Sixth Amendment has begun."2 4
These remarks bring to mind some notable words of Justice
Holmes: "Oh bring in a basin."25 One reason the gush is unwar-
ranted is that Lafler and Frye did not change the law. For more
than forty years, the Supreme Court has called plea bargaining an
"essential part of the [criminal] process" 26 and has recognized that
defendants have a right to the assistance of counsel in evaluating
offers and deciding whether to plead guilty.2 7 Indeed, this right is
just about the only right defendants who plead guilty still have.
The Court wrote in McMann v. Richardson in 1970, "In our view
a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice
is an intelligent plea . ... "28 It declared in Tollett v. Henderson in
1973 that a defendant who pleads guilty "may only attack the vol-
untary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that
the advice he received from counsel was not within the standard
set forth in McMann."29 In 1985, the Court indicated that an at-
torney's mistaken advice concerning a defendant's eligibility for
parole could invalidate a guilty plea, but only if the defendant
could show that suitable advice would have led him to stand tri-
al.3 0 In 2010, the Court held an attorney's performance deficient
because he failed to advise a client that a guilty plea could lead to
his deportation, but the Court did not consider whether the client
had shown prejudice.31
To be sure, until Lafler and Frye, the Court had not considered a
claim that a lawyer's deficient performance had produced, not an
ill-advised guilty plea, but an avoidable post-trial penalty. Eleven
of the twelve federal courts of appeals, however, had considered
23. Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargaining, Just as it Ever Was?, THE MAYHEw-HITE REPORT
ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE COURTS, (May 2012),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/epub/mayhew-hite/2012/05/plea-bargaining-just-as-it-ever-was/.
24. Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1161 (2012).
25. SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
469 n.11 (1989) (quoting a letter from Holmes to J. H. Wigmore, Nov. 1915).
26. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). The observation that, although
television dramas portray trials, the real world is dominated by plea bargains was com-
monplace forty years ago. Neither the Supreme Court nor any other observer of the Amer-
ican criminal justice system awoke to this truth only yesterday.
27. See the rulings described in the following paragraph.
28. 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970).
29. 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). I discuss McMann and Tollett in Albert W. Alschuler, The
Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1975).
30. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985).
31. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
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claims of this sort, and all of them had recognized that a defend-
ant was entitled to relief when his lawyer's defective representa-
tion caused him to lose a beneficial plea agreement.3 2 Most state
courts had agreed," although a very few had held that a diamond-
studded, gold-plated trial could make it immaterial whether a
lawyer's faulty performance during plea negotiation produced ex-
tra years of imprisonment for his client.34
32. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747, 752 (1st Cir. 1991) ("A defend-
ant has a right to be informed of a plea offer. Ordinarily, counsel's failure to do so consti-
tutes ineffective assistance of counsel."); Boria v. Keene, 99 F.3d 492, 496-99 (2d Cir. 1996)
(reducing a prisoner's sentence to time served because a lawyer who had advised him of a
prosecutor's offer failed to offer his personal assessment of the wisdom of accepting it);
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Failure by defense counsel to com-
municate a plea offer to defendant deprives defendant of the opportunity to present a plea
bargain for the consideration of the state judge . . . . A subsequent fair trial does not reme-
dy this deprivation."); United States v. Brannon, 48 Fed. Appx. 51, 53, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20969 (4th Cir. 2002) ("Erroneous advice during the plea negotiation process or the
failure of a defense attorney to timely inform his client of a plea offer constitutes unreason-
able professional assistance."); United States v. Herrera, 412 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2005)
("a 27-month increase in a sentence constitutes prejudice"); Cooper v. Lafler, 376 Fed. App'x
563, 573, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 95899 (6th Cir. 2010) ("Petitioner lost out on an opportuni-
ty to plead guilty and receive the lower sentence that was offered to him because he was
deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Thus, he has estab-
lished prejudice."), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Julian v. Bartley, 495
F.3d 487, 499 (7th Cir. 2007) ("but for the ill-advice, Julian would have taken the plea");
Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003) (defendant made out a prima facie
case of ineffective assistance by alleging that if he had "been informed accurately, he would
expressly have taken the bargain"); Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009)
("the prejudice Mr. Williams identified was that, had he been adequately counseled, there
is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer"); Oliver v. United
States, 292 Fed. App'x 886, 887, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19743 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that
failing to inform the defendant of the government's "eve-of-trial plea offer . . . constitutes
deficient performance"); United States v. Mouling, 557 F.3d 658, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("An
evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether Mouling knew the details of the plea
offer and whether there was a reasonable probability he would have accepted the offer had
counsel properly informed him of it.").
33. See e.g., Davie v. State, 675 S.E.2d 416 (S. Car. 2009); Charmichael v. People, 206
P.3d 800 (Colo. 2009); Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2007); Dew v. State, 843
N.E.2d 556 (Ind. App. 2006); Jiminez v. State, 144 P.3d 903, 907 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006);
Commonwealth v. Mahar, 809 N.E. 2d 989, 993 (Mass. 2004); People v. Gandiaga, 70 P.3d
523, 527 (Colo. App. 2002); State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. App. 2000); State v.
Tacetta, 797 A.2d 884 (N.J. Super 2002): State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 430-31 (Tenn.
2000); Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); In re McCreedy, 996 P.2d
658 (Wash. App. 2000); Becton v. Hun, 516 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1999); People v. Curry, 687
N.E.2d 877 (111. 1997); State v. Lentowski, 569 N.W.2d 758 (Wis. 1997); Williams v. State,
605 A.2d 103 (Md. App. 1992); State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671 (Iowa 1986).
34. See Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795, 802-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Greuber,
165 P.3d 1185, 1189 (Utah 2007). In Winward v. State, 293 P.3d 259 (Utah 2012), the Utah
Supreme Court acknowledged that Lafler and Frye had repudiated its decision in Greuber.
The court observed, however, "Greuber may remain good law to the extent that it guides
lower courts in fashioning a remedy." Id. at 269 n.12.
Two Band-Aids
The consensus of the courts prior to Lafler and Frye may not
have rested entirely on their concern for defendants' rights. En-
suring that prosecutors' offers reach defendants is in the interest
of plea-hungry prosecutors and courts as well as defendants them-
selves. Ensuring that lawyers convey accurately the coercive pow-
er of these offers helps to keep the river of guilty pleas flowing.
Deficient lawyering in Lafler and Frye may not only have cost two
defendants years of their lives but also required the state to pay
the cost of an unnecessary trial."
If the dissenters' views had prevailed, Lafler and Frye would
have been revolutionary, but the majority opinions were not. In
fact, both majority opinions concluded that the courts below had
been too generous in affording relief to the petitioners." Because
Lafler and Frye gave defendants nothing they did not already
have, Justice Scalia protested too much when he became the first
to award these decisions landmark status: "[Tihe Court today
opens a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure:
plea-bargaining law."3 7 It was the author of those words who must
have been dozing like Rip Van Winkle.
III. MISSION IMPOSSIBLE: GUARANTEEING THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THE PLEA NEGOTIATION PROCESS
Even if Lafler and Frye had not fudged the question of remedy
and even if these decisions had burst on the scene bold, new, and
shiny, they would not warrant the hype bestowed upon them by
professors and the press. Three observations about the American
legal system I made twenty-seven years ago seem relevant.
First, our plea-dominated system makes the kind of justice a
"defendant receives more dependent on the quality of his counsel
35. Only one unnecessary trial. After the prosecutor's offer lapsed in Frye, the defend-
ant pleaded guilty without a bargain.
Josh Bowers notes, "The government may be the unsung winner of Lafler v. Cooper
and Missouri v. Frye." Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing,
25 FED. SENT'G. REP. 126, 126 (2012). In his view, these decisions "merely have helped
guarantee that a defendant has a lawyer good enough to convince him that the prosecutor
holds the cards and that he is sunk." Id.
36. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410-11 ("The Court of Appeals erred .. . in articulating the
precise standard for prejudice in this context. As noted, a defendant in Frye's position must
show not only a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the lapsed plea but also
a reasonable probability that the prosecutor would have adhered to the agreement and that
it would have been accepted by the trial court."); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (holding that the
district court and the Court of Appeals erred by ordering specific performance of the
agreement the petitioner would have entered if he had received adequate advice).
37. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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than any other legal system in the world." Second, this system
"subjects defense attorneys to serious temptations to disregard
their clients' interests." And third, this system "makes it impossi-
ble to determine whether defendants have received the effective
assistance of counsel."" Decisions like Lafler and Frye can neither
guarantee effective legal representation in the plea negotiation
process nor do much to make it more likely.
Defenses of plea negotiation offer sweet pictures of well-
informed defendants making rational assessments of surrender
and gain." They depend on the assumption that defendants will
be well represented. For private attorneys, however, a guilty plea
is a quick buck. Defense attorneys have good reasons for collect-
ing their fees in advance, and once they have pocketed their fees,
their personal interests lie in disposing of their cases as rapidly as
possible. This conflict of interest influences even well-paid, con-
scientious lawyers, and the bar includes some lawyers who are
neither well paid nor conscientious. They handle a high volume of
cases for small fees and almost never take a case to trial.40
Plea negotiation also minimizes work and reduces conflict with-
in what organizational theorists call the "courtroom workgroup.""
Bargaining promotes cordial and comfortable relationships with
prosecutors and judges. These interests may influence public de-
fenders even more than they do private lawyers.42
Advising a client to enter a plea agreement can never be proven
wrong. Taking a case to trial and losing may appear to have been
a bad choice, especially when this decision has produced a sen-
tence two or twenty times more severe than the one the prosecutor
offered before trial. A bad outcome at trial may cause both the
client's regard for his lawyer and the lawyer's self-esteem to suf-
38. Albert W. Alschuler, Personal Failure, Institutional Failure, and the Sixth Amend-
ment, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 149, 156 (1986).
39. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970); Thomas W. Church, In Defense of "Bargain Justice", 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
509 (1979); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J.
1969 (1992).
40. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE
L.J. 1179, 1181-1206 (1975).
41. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 192 (2d ed.
1990); STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31 (2012); JAMES
EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
CRIMINAL COURTS 294 (2d ed. 1991); HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE 234
(1993); SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, 1950-1990 at 87 (1993).
42. See Alschuler, supra note 40, at 1206-55.
682 Vol. 51
Summer 2013 Two Band-Aids
fer. It also may increase the likelihood of a claim of professional
ineffectiveness. When one has entered a plea agreement, howev-
er, he can always imagine that the outcome of a trial would have
been worse. Advising a client to plead guilty is nearly always the
safe, secure, comfortable, and profitable course. Everything in our
criminal justice system pushes in that direction.
A lawyer's conferences with his client are not public, and nei-
ther are his bargaining sessions with the prosecutor. The effec-
tiveness of Lafler and Frye depend on the willingness of lawyers to
acknowledge failings so serious that their conduct falls below what
the Supreme Court calls "the wide range of reasonable profession-
al assistance."43 The lawyers whose performances were judged
ineffective in Lafler and Frye were appropriately forthcoming,"
but when a defendant says, "my lawyer never told me about the
offer," and the lawyer says, "oh yes I did," the defendant is almost
43. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) ("A court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable profes-
sional assistance.").
44. In Frye,
[tirial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that trial counsel
could not recall whether he had communicated the Offer to Frye. Trial
counsel testified that there was no correspondence in his file to indicate
any effort was made by his office to mail the Offer to Frye. Trial coun-
sel could not recall speaking with, seeing, or ever attempting to contact
Frye during the Offer window of November 15, 2007, to December 28,
2007.
Frye v. State, 311 S.W.3d 350, 352 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct.
1399 (2012).
In Lafler, counsel testified that he advised his client to reject the prosecutor's offer
because the charge of which the client later was convicted "could not be supported by the
evidence." Counsel earlier had prompted the prosecutor to withdraw his offer by saying on
the record of a pretrial conference that there was "insufficient evidence" and that the "Pros-
ecution does not have the evidence to try to [sic] this case." See Cooper v. Lafler, 376 Fed.
Appx. 563, 566, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 95899 (6th Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded, 132 S.
Ct. 1376 (2012). The Supreme Court said in Lafler that it was
unclear whether respondent's counsel believed respondent could not be
convicted for assault with intent to murder as a matter of law because
the shots hit Mundy below the waist, or whether he simply thought this
would be a persuasive argument to make to the jury to show lack of spe-
cific intent. And . . . an erroneous strategic prediction about the out-
come of a trial is not necessarily deficient performance. Here, however,
the fact of deficient performance has been conceded by all the parties
.... [Tihere is no need to address that question.
132 S. Ct. at 1390-91.
The lawyers whose performances were judged ineffective in Lafler and Frye proba-
bly were not among those whose performance should prompt the most serious concern. Not
only were these lawyers forthright about their errors; at least one of them was willing to try
his cases. (The defendant in Frye ultimately pleaded guilty without a bargain.) If the de-
fendant's lawyer in Lafler had taken the easy course and advised his client to plead guilty,
his conduct would not have been judged ineffective.
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certain to lose. When a defendant claims that his lawyer misin-
formed him, many lawyers are likely to respond that the defend-
ant misunderstood.
Moreover, the confessions of lawyers must be of a particular
kind. Failing to convey critical information (say, about the exist-
ence of an offer) may entitle a client to relief, and negligent mis-
statements of law or fact may too. 5 So may ignoring or failing to
investigate important evidence, trading the interests of one client
for the interests of another, and refusing to bargain at all in a case
offering little or no chance of success at trial.46 Self-interested ad-
vice to plead guilty, inept negotiating, and erroneous predictions,
however, almost certainly will not suffice. In our lawyer-
supportive legal system, no one need recognize the ineffectiveness
of the weakest members of the bar, not even the weak lawyers
themselves. One can always conjure up plausible reasons for a
default.47
A prosecutor in Ventura County, California recalled the tele-
phone calls he received from a lawyer who invariably persuaded
his clients to plead guilty. "Phil," this lawyer would say, "will you
let my guy go with a misdemeanor? Of course we'll plead anyway,
but I just wondered if you could let him go with a misdemeanor."
The prosecutor always answered that he could not reduce the
charge "in view of the circumstances of the case."48 Although the
lawyer described by this prosecutor pocketed his clients' cash
without helping them, Lafler and Frye will not touch him. Judi-
cial decisions cannot significantly ameliorate the problem of defec-
tive, self-interested lawyering in the plea-negotiation process.
45. Some lawyers go to the point of lying to their clients in order to persuade them to
plead guilty. A few even extract additional payments by claiming falsely that "the fix is in."
See Alschuler, supra note 40, at 1194-97. A lawyer willing to lie to his clients, however,
probably is willing to lie about lying.
46. See Rishi Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation,
14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RES. 309, 325-31 (2013).
47. Cf Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 ("Bargaining is, by its nature, defined to a substantial
degree by personal style. The alternative courses and tactics in negotiation are so individu-
al that it may be neither prudent nor practicable to try to elaborate or define detailed
standards for the proper discharge of defense counsel's participation in the process.").
48. Conversation with Phillip E. Johnson sometime.
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IV. THE ALCHEMY OF AMERICAN TRIALS: TURNING GOLD INTO
LEAD
A. Finding a Baseline
American defendants plead guilty in overwhelming numbers49
because the sentences imposed pursuant to plea agreements are
substantially less severe than those imposed following convictions
at trial." Defenders of plea negotiation typically treat post-trial
sentences as the baseline from which plea agreements are to be
judged. They (and many critics) view plea-bargained sentences as
departures from an ethical norm." Justice Scalia's dissent in
Lafler describes plea negotiation as a way to "beat the house, that
is, to serve less time than the law says [an offender] deserves."52
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lafler rejects the assump-
tion that post-trial sentences are an appropriate ethical baseline.
He quotes Professor Bibas: "'The expected post-trial sentence is
imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like the sticker price
for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full
price as the norm and anything less a bargain.'"" Justice Kenne-
dy reiterates the point in Frye, this time quoting Professor
Barkow: "'[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose
receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor
might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the
49. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (noting that "ninety-seven percent of federal convictions
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas") (citing DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE, Table 5.22.2009, http//www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf and DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, S. ROSENMERKEL, M. DUROSE, & D. FAROLE,
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006-Statistical Tables, p. 1 (NCJ226846, rev. Nov.
2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/publ/pdflfsscG6st.pdf).
50. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 652, 653-57 (1981).
51. For example, Thomas W. Church's defense of plea bargaining recognizes that "bar-
gaining, particularly when the judge or prosecutor manipulates post trial sentencing phi-
losophy sentences to 'punish' those who refuse to plead guilty, can operate to coerce or
unfairly encourage guilty pleas." Church, supra note 39, at 519. In a "defensible plea bar-
gaining system," Church says,
those cases that go to trial must be decided on the merits, without pe-
nalizing the defendant for not pleading guilty. In other words, trial sen-
tences must be objectively deserved according to whatever is embodied
in the penal code. Plea bargaining should therefore result in sentences
less than this theoretically correct sentence.
Id. at 520.
52. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1387 (quoting Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market:
From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011)).
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books largely for bargaining purposes.'"54 If accurate, the observa-
tions of Professors Bibas and Barkow rout the central claim of the
dissenters-that "a full dress criminal trial" is the "exorbitant gold
standard of American justice""-and the dissenters offer no reply.
Shortly after endorsing the Bibas and Barkow observations,
however, the Frye majority disregards their implications. Justice
Kennedy writes, "To note the prevalence of plea bargaining is not
to criticize it. The potential to conserve valuable resources and for
defendants to admit their crimes and receive more favorable terms
at sentencing means that a plea agreement can benefit both par-
ties.""
If post-trial sentences are unjust and are imposed simply for the
purpose of inducing guilty pleas (as the Supreme Court recognizes
five-to-four), plea bargaining surely merits criticism. This process
then benefits both parties only in the sense that a gunman's de-
mand for your money or your life benefits you as well as the gun-
man. Compared to death at the hands of the gunman, "your mon-
ey or your life" is a great offer. Proposals commonly are treated as
coercive, however-as "threats" rather than "offers"-when refus-
ing them would leave recipients worse off than they ought to be."
54. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006)). Bibas's remark can be read as saying
only that the sentences imposed following trials depart from the statistical norm (some-
thing that no one would deny). Barkow's statement says more clearly that these sentences
(or many of them) depart from an ethical norm as well.
55. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1407 (majority opinion).
57. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION passim (1987); Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint
and Confession, 74 DENVER U.L. REV. 957, 962-67 (1997) (reviewing several approaches to
defining coercion and explaining why the better ones focus on the wrongfulness of proposals
rather than the supposedly overborne wills of the people receiving them). See generally
Scott Anderson, Coercion, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta,
ed., Winter 2011), http://plato.stanford.edulentries/coercion/#ThrBas.
Although distinguishing between rewards and penalties makes sense in many
contexts, I have argued that officials should employ neither penalties nor rewards to induce
confessions or pleas of guilty. See Alschuler, supra note 57, at 967-69. The common law
took the same position, declaring that a guilty plea or confession induced by either a prom-
ise or a threat was involuntary. See, e.g., Rex v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (Cr. Cas.
1783) (holding a confession obtained "by promise of favour" inadmissible); Hopt v. Utah,
110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884) (declaring that a confession must be "uninfluenced by hope of
reward or fear of punishment"); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896) (declar-
ing a confession "inadmissible if made under any threat, promise, or encouragement of any
hope or favor"); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (declaring that a con-
fession may not be received in evidence unless it is "free and voluntary; that is, must not be
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises,
however slight").
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Choosing the appropriate ethical baseline is not simply a matter
of perspective, and, when one seriously examines our criminal jus-
tice system, Bibas, Barkow, and the Lafler-Frye majority appear to
have it right. Before I explain why, however, it seems appropriate
to consider the suggestion of a participant in this symposium that
plea bargains really aren't bargains at all.
B. An Unconvincing Study
On one point, David Abrams' empirical findings match almost
everyone else's. He reports that the sentences imposed following
convictions at trial are substantially more severe than those im-
posed following pleas of guilty.ss Abrams maintains, however,
that this frequently repeated finding answers the wrong question.
In Abrams' view, earlier studies erred by considering only de-
fendants who were convicted by guilty plea or at trial." His study
includes acquitted defendants as well. It treats the sentences of
these defendants as zero. With these "sentences" of zero included
in the mix of post-trial sentences, the post-trial sentences no long-
er appear to be more severe than those imposed following guilty
pleas. To the contrary, they appear to be much less severe.o As a
group, defendants who have taken their cases to trial appear to
have achieved better results than those who have pleaded guilty."1
Abrams does not spell out what lesson he would draw from this
finding, but he seems to suggest that plea bargains are usually
bad deals for defendants. A risk-neutral defendant who discounts
his probable post-conviction sentence by the likelihood of acquittal
and compares it to the prosecutor's offer should usually reject the
offer and go to trial. This defendant then will either win big or
58. David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 200,
209 (2011).
59. See id. at 202-03.
60. See id. at 209. The reason why prior sentencing studies focused on convicted rather
than acquitted defendants is not difficult to discern. A finding that some offenders received
more severe sentences than other, equally culpable offenders only because they exercised
their right to trial may be cause for concern. A finding that offenders received more severe
sentences than non-offenders, however, is cause for celebration, not concern. This finding
is also unsurprising.
61. When Abrams regressed on variables like age, race, sex, and type of offense, the
correlation he found between insisting on trial and receiving a less severe sentence re-
mained strong. I summarize Abrams' central finding by saying that, as a group, defend-
ants who stood trial received less severe sentences than defendants who pleaded guilty, but
one could also say things like, "As a group, young white men who stood trial for weapons
offenses received less severe sentences than young white men who pleaded guilty to weap-
ons offenses." Disaggregation of this sort would not affect the analysis that follows.
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lose big, but insisting on trial will on balance reduce his expected
punishment.62
For reasons I will explain shortly, I do not credit Abrams' prin-
cipal finding." Even if I accepted this finding, however, I would
not draw the lesson Abrams invites readers to draw. The discov-
ery that defendants who went to trial achieved better results as a
group than defendants who pleaded guilty does not show that any
defendant in either group miscalculated. This finding may indi-
cate only that plea bargains were good deals for defendants who
took them and bad deals for those who didn't.
Every defendant in Abrams' sample who was acquitted might
have discounted his expected post-trial sentence by the likelihood
of acquittal and might have matched this discounted sentence
against the prosecutor's offer, and every one of them might have
made the correct choice. Every defendant who pleaded guilty also
might have discounted the expected post-trial sentence by the
likelihood of acquittal, and every one of them might have made
the correct choice as well.'
Imagine, for example, a jurisdiction with a marvelous public de-
fender system, the County of Dershowitz. Capably advised de-
fendants in Dershowitz accept only offers that are truly in their
interests. The District Attorney of Dershowtiz, however, is per-
verse. One day, he charges ten thousand men of Harvard with
mayhem simply because a near-sighted witness, Magoo, reported
seeing these men covered in crimson. The ten thousand men of
Harvard demand trials, and all of them are acquitted. Abrams
records their sentences as zero, and ten thousand sentences of ze-
ro bring the mean post-trial sentence to a tiny fraction of the mean
62. Abrams embraced this thesis more clearly in the abstract of his article than in the
article itself:
Conventional wisdom suggests that defendants are better served by en-
tering into a plea bargain, to avoid what is known as the "trial penalty."
In this article I present evidence that this notion is likely mistaken. In
OLS regressions using data from Cook County state courts, I find that a
risk-neutral defendant seeking to minimize his or her expected sentence
would do substantially better by rejecting a plea bargain. I also employ
an IV approach to the question and, while the instrument is weak, the
results are consistent with the OLS: defendants are better off going to
trial.
Abrams, supra note 58, at 200 (abstract).
63. Many of the defendants whom Abrams described as standing trial did not in fact
stand trial. See text at notes 65-74 infra.
64. The defendants who were convicted at trial and received more severe sentences
than those in the two other groups can be said in retrospect to have made erroneous choic-
es, but even they might have made appropriate judgments (or bets) ex ante.
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post-guilty-plea sentence. The existence of ten thousand wrongly
accused Harvard men, however, reveals nothing about the wisdom
of the choices made by the ably advised defendants who pleaded
guilty before the district attorney went berserk. It also reveals
nothing about the wisdom of the many defendants who are sched-
uled to plead guilty in Dershowitz tomorrow. The agreements
these defendants entered with the district attorney may indeed
have been bargains.
In any event, Abrams does not convince me that, with acquittals
included, post-trial sentences are less severe than post-plea sen-
tences. Abrams studied official court data from Cook County, Illi-
nois-"a data set containing 42,552 cases initiated between 1997
and 2001 that were completed by the end of 2004."" Because
more than 40,000 felony cases were resolved annually in the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County during this period," the data set does
not appear to include all of the cases that began and ended within
the study period. Indeed, Abrams acknowledged in his presenta-
tion at this symposium that his data set did not include all cases.
Abrams also did not reveal whether the data included misde-
meanor as well as felony cases, but they seem to consist almost
entirely of felony cases.
Most of Abrams' study is presented in the obscure language of
empirical economists, but I believe I understand Table 2." This
table divides defendants into those who pleaded guilty and those
who stood trial. One column then reveals what proportion of de-
fendants in various offense categories were convicted.
It comes as no surprise that 100% of the defendants who plead-
ed guilty were convicted, but the percentage of convicted defend-
ants in the group that stood trial could raise eyebrows. Abrams
reports conviction rates of 50% for defendants tried on drug pos-
session charges, 48% for those tried on drug distribution charges,
36% for those tried on weapons charges, 47% for those tried on
65. Abrams, supra note 58, at 208.
66. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, STATISTICAL SUMMARY 2001,
Caseload and Statistical Records, Felony Dispositions and Sentences by County Circuit
Courts of Illinois, Calendar Year 2001 (hereinafter "ANNUAL REPORT"),
http://www.state.il.us/court/supremecourt/AnnualReport/2001/StatsSumm/pdf/cir caseload
&stat.pdf (reporting that 42,453 defendants were charged with felonies in the Circuit Court
of Cook County during calendar year 2001).
67. Beyond mentioning that all of the study cases were resolved at one Cook County
courthouse (2600 South California Avenue), Abrams did not indicate how the data set was
compiled.
68. See Abrams, supra note 58, at 212 tbl. 2.
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theft charges, 53% for those tried on burglary charges, 43% for
those tried on robbery charges, 47% for those tried on car theft
charges, and 55% for those tried on charges of assault and battery.
In most offense categories, more defendants appear to have been
acquitted than convicted. In no offense category did the conviction
rate exceed 55%, and in one category it was only 36%."
Abrams evidently included a large number of sentences of zero
in his mix of post-trial sentences. Although he did not supply the
number, it seems a reasonable guess that roughly half of the sen-
tences in his post-trial mix were sentences of zero. It was as
though the 10,000 wrongly accused men of Harvard had marched
from the County of Dershowitz to the County of Cook.
I have lived in Cook County; I have practiced and taught law in
Cook County; I have studied Cook County; and Professor Abrams'
Cook County is not the one I know. Statistics included in the An-
nual Report of the Illinois Courts permit one to calculate the con-
viction rates in felony cases tried in Cook County in 2001, a year
that was both typical and included in Abrams' study period. In
that year, 75% of the 301 felony defendants tried by juries and
81% of the 10,996 felony defendants tried by judges were. convict-
ed. 0 These conviction rates are similar to those reported by other
American jurisdictions."
The disparity between the normal Cook County conviction rates
reported by the Illinois courts and the surprisingly low conviction
rates reported by Abrams is apparently explained by the fact that
Abrams treated all defendants whose cases ended without convic-
tion as though they had been acquitted. Abrams in fact acknowl-
edged during his presentation at this symposium that many of the
defendants whom his article described as "acquitted at trial" were
not acquitted at trial at all.
The Annual Report of the Illinois Courts includes a catchall cat-
egory of terminated cases called "remaining balance." This cate-
gory "includes such dispositions as transfers to inactive/fugitive
warrant calendar, extradition proceedings, and dismissed on mo-
tion of state." The number of cases in this category in Cook Coun-
69. Id.
70. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66.
71. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, Sara Sun Beale, Mary Rose, & Laura F. Donnelly, Should We
Rush to Reform the Criminal Jury?: Consider Conviction Rate Data, 80 JUDICATURE 286,
287-89 (1997) (reporting jury trial conviction rates in felony cases of 68.3% in North Caroli-
na, 58.9% in Florida, 82.1% in California, 84% in Texas, 72.3% in New York State, and
more than 80% in both drug and non-drug cases in the federal courts).
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ty in 2001 dwarfed the number of acquittals at trial, 7,848 to
2,134. When the "remaining balance" cases are treated as acquit-
tals or "non-convictions," Cook County's overall conviction rate in
cases not resolved by guilty pleas drops to a rate resembling those
that Abrams reported, 48%.72
Abrams' study thus reveals that defendants who abscond re-
ceive lower sentences than defendants who plead guilty-that is,
until they are caught. It also teaches us that extradited defend-
ants receive lower sentences than defendants who plead guilty-
that is, until they are tried in the jurisdictions to which they are
sent. And it reminds lawyers never to urge clients to enter plea
agreements when prosecutors are willing to dismiss their cases
outright.
The low conviction rates Abrams reported enabled him to place
a large number of sentences of zero in the cauldron of sentences
imposed following trials. This number was not typical of the
American criminal justice system or even of Cook County.
Abrams' study does not provide convincing evidence that defend-
ants who stand trial generally achieve better results than those
who plead guilty, and even if it did, it would not show that any of
the defendants who entered plea agreements had been snook-
ered.74
C. The Expected Difference Between Sentences Imposed
Following Trials and Those Imposed Following Guilty Pleas
Consider what offers and agreements should look like in a plea-
bargaining system that does only what bargaining prosecutors
and defense attorneys acknowledge (and boast) that they do.
Viewing offers and agreements from this perspective will lead to a
72. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66.
73. Some dismissals occur after defendants have refused to enter plea agreements. For
example, a prosecutor might have offered to permit a guilty plea to a misdemeanor in ex-
change for the dismissal of a motion to suppress evidence. The defendant might have de-
clined the prosecutor's offer and prevailed on the motion to suppress. With critical evidence
suppressed, the prosecutor then might have dismissed the case. Other dismissals, however,
occur because prosecutors recognize that their cases should never have been filed. An effort
to determine whether "a plea is a bargain" should not include dismissals in the comparison
group without differentiating among dismissals.
74. Abrams noted at the symposium that his findings were robust. He was confident
that had he actually compared post-trial sentences to post-guilty-plea sentences, the post-
trial sentences would have been less severe. Abrams might be correct, and it would be
worth the effort to find out. The following section of this article considers circumstances
that might explain findings like Abrams' if these findings were replicated in a better con-
ceived and better executed study.
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few additional remarks about what might account for findings like
David Abrams'.
Prosecutors readily acknowledge engaging in both "odds bar-
gaining" and "costs bargaining. "1 That is, they offer lower sen-
tences in exchange for guilty pleas both to eliminate the risk of
acquittal at trial and to avoid the cost of trials. A prosecutor who
engaged only in odds bargaining might estimate the likelihood of a
defendant's conviction at trial at 50% and the defendant's proba-
ble sentence if convicted at trial at ten years. The prosecutor then
might offer the defendant a sentence of five years in exchange for
his plea. Prosecutors sometimes quote the line, "Half a loaf is bet-
ter than none."
To be sure, this illustration is oversimplified. For most defend-
ants, the first year of a prison term has greater disutility than the
last, and part of an offender's punishment consists, not of impris-
onment, but of the stigmatization and disabilities that follow con-
viction. Sophisticated bargainers take account of these conse-
quences and others, but the simplified illustration suffices here.
I have cast students in their first week of law school as prosecu-
tors instructed by a superior to bargain with the sole goal of ob-
taining the most punishment they can for every taxpayer dollar
expended." I then have asked them to consider what their last,
best offer would be to a defendant whose likelihood of conviction at
trial was 50% and who faced ten years of imprisonment if convict-
ed. After a student has proposed a five-year offer, I have asked
whether other students would increase or decrease it. Students
invariably have struggled to justify lesser discounts from the pre-
dicted ten-year post-trial sentence. It typically has taken some
cajolery on my part to prompt a student to give the correct answer
from an economic or "bangs for the buck" perspective: the dis-
count should be greater.
On the simplified assumptions noted above, a five-year offer
would leave a risk-neutral defendant indifferent to the choice be-
tween guilty plea and trial." A cost-conserving prosecutor, how-
75. I owe this terminology to Paul Schectman.
76. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 50, 52-85 (1968).
77. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STuD. 289, 289 (1983) ("I argue in this essay that the aspects of criminal procedure treated
with the greatest skepticism by academics and the popular press - prosecutorial discretion,
plea bargaining, and sentencing discretion - may be understood as elements of a well-
functioning market system.") (internal citations omitted).
78. The assumption of risk neutrality is a further oversimplification:
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ever, does not want the defendant to be indifferent. He hopes to
avoid a trial and is prepared to engage in costs bargaining as well
as odds bargaining. The prosecutor therefore tailors his offer, not
to balance, but to overbalance the defendant's chances of acquittal.
The prosecutor's final offer might be four years, three or two. It
might be influenced by how much he expects a trial to cost.
If defendants faced the same costs as prosecutors and were
equally concerned to avoid them, costs bargaining would disap-
pear from the calculus. Defendants, however, are not equally con-
cerned to minimize costs. About 80% are indigent and are repre-
sented by public defenders or other appointed attorneys.7 9  They
do not pay the costs of trials," and, at least in theory, their law-
yers focus only on their interests, not the taxpayers'.
Defendants represented by private attorneys do pay some of the
costs of trial, and the prospect of higher legal fees can influence
them to plead guilty.8 ' Because limiting criminal punishment
ranks highly on most defendants' utility curves, however, they are
not inclined to be frugal. "It's like buying a casket," one lawyer
reported. "They're not worried about how much it costs-until
later."82 Because cost concerns are asymmetrical, defendants
should engage mostly in odds bargaining while prosecutors engage
in both odds bargaining and costs bargaining. Agreement should
One of the commodities that the representatives of the state "sell" dur-
ing pretrial negotiations is certainty. During the period between arrest
and trial, most defendants experience a great and understandable anxi-
ety about what will happen to them. The promise that a prosecutor or
trial judge offers in a bargaining session usually provides the first au-
thoritative answer to that question that a defendant can secure. A trial,
by contrast, represents what Oakland Public Defender John D. Nunes
called "a plunge from an unknown height."... [T]he reduction of anxie-
ty-the minimization of grab-bag uncertainty-is itself a value to many
defendants.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059,
1080-81 (1976).
79. STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SELECTED FINDINGS: INDIGENT DEFENSE 4 (1996), available at
http//bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflid.pdf (reporting the percentage of felony defendants with
appointed attorneys in America's 75 largest counties).
80. Again, I oversimplify. The costs of trial include time and anxiety as well as money,
and non-monetary costs can influence plea negotiations.
81. See Scott Shane, From Spy to Source to Convict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at Al
(Former C.I.A. agent John Kiriakou "said he had paid his defense lawyers more than
$100,000 and still owed them $500,000; the specter of additional, bankrupting legal fees,
along with the risk of a far longer prison term that could separate him from his wife and
children for a decade or more, prompted him to take the plea offer . . . .").
82. Jackson B. Battle, In Search of the Adversary System: The Cooperative Practices of
Private Criminal Defense Attorneys, 50 TEx. L. REV. 60, 111 (1971).
693
Duquesne Law Review
come only when the prosecutor has made an offer that overbalanc-
es the defendant's chances of acquittal.
When a defendant is certain to be acquitted at trial, the prose-
cutor cannot make an offer that will overbalance his chances of
acquittal,8 3 but in almost every other case, he can. The prosecutor
can get the most punishment for the government's bucks by mak-
ing such an offer, and the defendant can reduce his expected pun-
ishment by accepting it. Does it follow that, in a system of costs
bargaining and odds bargaining, there should be no trials? Do
cases go to trial only when defendants are so convinced of their
innocence, so indignant about prosecutorial overreaching, or so
ashamed to admit their guilt that they press their luck irrational-
ly? Many cases do go to trial for those reasons, but the answer is
probably no.
Even when both parties engage only in costs bargaining and
odds bargaining, they may disagree about circumstances that in-
fluence the bargaining calculus: what post-trial sentence is likely,
what subjective disutility (or suffering) various punishments are
likely to impose, what a trial is likely to cost, and, perhaps most
importantly, what chance the defendant has of winning at trial.
The differences in the parties' estimates may prevent an agree-
ment.
For example, although the prosecutor and defense attorney
might both estimate the defendant's probable post-trial sentence
at ten years, the prosecutor might believe that the likelihood of
conviction is 90% while the defense attorney might estimate it at
50%. The prosecutor then might conclude that agreeing to any-
thing less than, say, an eight-year-sentence would not be cost-
effective, while the defendant, advised by his attorney, might con-
clude that any sentence of five years or more would not minimize
his expected punishment. The parties would be unlikely to reach
an agreement.
Lawyers who generally adhere to the economic model described
above may depart from it sometimes. For example, a prosecutor
might fear that the public would disapprove his offer of a light
sentence in a publicized case. (The public seems not to under-
stand how, in a regime of odds bargaining, the offer of a seemingly
ludicrous sentence can advance its interests.) Or the prosecutor
83. Again, I abstract from the "process costs" of trial. See Albert W. Alschuler, Imple-
menting the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining Sys-
tem, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 949-52 (1983).
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might wish to gain trial experience, try a case against a noted de-
fense attorney, or seek fame and political fortune by trying a
front-page case. Similarly, a defense attorney might conclude that
trying a prominent case will be good advertising.'
Some prosecutors and defense attorneys toss the economic mod-
el to the winds. One prosecutor declared,
When I sit down with a defense attorney who knows how to be
reasonable, we judge the whole man. Neither of us cares
what evidence would be admissible and what would not, or
which one of us would win at trial. We simply try to do the
fair thing with each case."
Frequent departures from the economic model occur because, as
noted above, the personal interests of defense attorneys encourage
them to recommend guilty pleas to their clients." A prosecutor
need not offer a sentence that will overbalance the defendant's
chances of acquittal when the defense attorney does not insist on
such an offer and back his demand with a credible threat of trial.
When defense attorneys sell out their clients too cheaply, find-
ings like those reported by David Abrams should come as no sur-
prise." As a group, defendants who plead guilty may obtain less
favorable outcomes than those who stand trial because many of
them are represented by lawyers who do not press hard for the
offers that economic theory says prosecutors should make.
At the same time, a lawyer who demands an offer minimizing
his client's expected punishment may not get it, for prosecutors
may be the ones who forsake the economic model. Like my first-
year law students, they may recoil from placing the greatest pres-
sure to plead guilty on defendants who may be innocent and/or
from offering sentences far lighter than they believe honest-to-God
offenders deserve. Although these prosecutors may engage in
odds bargaining, they may not take the process to its logical con-
clusion. When prosecutors refuse in some cases to make offers
that overbalance the defendants' chances of acquittal, the defend-
ants in these cases will, as a group, achieve better results by in-
84. For a more sophisticated and complete examination of why plea-bargaining reality
often bears little resemblance to the economic model, see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
85. Alschuler, supra note 76, at 54.
86. See text at notes 37-43 supra.
87. See text at notes 59-61 supra.
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sisting on trial. There may be enough of them to produce findings
like those Abrams reported.
To reiterate, departures from the economic model by either
prosecutors or defense attorneys could produce findings like those
of David Abrams. Findings like his, however, do not conclusively
establish any departure from the model. In the small minority of
cases that go to trial, negotiators may differ in their estimates of
the likelihood of conviction and/or other circumstances affecting
the bargaining calculus, and the predictions of defendants and
their lawyers generally may be better than those of prosecutors. 8
D. A Hard Look at the Post-Trial Baseline
As noted above, Justice Scalia and the other Lafler-Frye dis-
senters view plea bargaining as a way for an offender to "to serve
less time than the law says he deserves."" Justice Kennedy and
the other justices in the Lafler-Frye majority reply that the sen-
tences imposed following conviction at trial often are undeserved.
Many of these sentences are more severe "'than even Congress or
the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sen-
tences exist on the books largely for bargaining purposes."'90 Alt-
hough the majority praises plea bargaining as beneficial to both
parties, its recognition that post-trial sentences often are imposed
to gain bargaining leverage makes the process indefensible-
different in degree but not in principle from the transaction pro-
posed by a gunman who demands your money or your life.91
Here is a multiple-choice question. Which of the following six
propositions best captures your view of the partly empirical, partly
conceptual issue that divided the majority and dissenting justices:
88. I do not consider this last hypothesis particularly likely. To the contrary, infor-
mation asymmetries suggest that prosecutors should have the edge in estimating probable
trial outcomes. Although defendants know better than prosecutors whether they are guilty
or innocent, this information might not make them better predictors. Indeed, an unwill-
ingness to face the fact that juries sometimes convict the innocent could distort an innocent
defendant's predictions. Lawyers generally regard both innocent and guilty defendants as
too optimistic about their prospects at trial. See BIBAS, supra note 41, at 55. Moreover,
professional estimates of trial outcomes are likely to be superior to amateur estimates, and
unlike defense attorneys, prosecutors need not respect the wishes of amateur clients. Pros-
ecutors are likely to know more than defendants and their lawyers about the most im-
portant determinant of trial outcomes, the strength or weakness of their evidence.
89. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Rachel E. Barkow, Separa-
tion of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006)).
91. See text at notes 53-57 supra.
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Does plea bargaining reward defendants who plead guilty or pe-
nalize those who stand trial?
A. An Incoherent Question. The concepts of harshness and
leniency are relative and draw meaning only from each
other. "If we are 'lenient' toward [defendants who plead
guilty], we are by precisely the same token 'more severe'
toward [those who plead not guilty]."92 Asking whether
plea bargaining rewards defendants who plead guilty or
penalizes defendants convicted at trial is incoherent.
When bargaining does one thing, it also does the other.
B. An Unanswerable Question. Whether plea bargaining
rewards defendants who plead guilty or penalizes defend-
ants convicted at trial is a sensible query, but it is not a
question that anyone can resolve. In principle, one can
envision a "Goldilocks" or "just right" sentence-the sen-
tence an offender deserves or the sentence that best ac-
complishes the law's forward-looking, crime-prevention
purposes. If a defendant who pleads guilty receives a sen-
tence less severe than the Goldilocks sentence, he is re-
warded. Such a sentence may short-change the public,
but it benefits him. At the same time, an offender who
receives a sentence more severe than the Goldilocks sen-
tence because he has stood trial is unfairly penalized.
The constitutional right to trial means at a minimum that
the government may not make standing trial a crime. On
this view, the concepts of harshness and leniency need not
be relative; they can describe deviations in opposite direc-
tions from a moral baseline. In practice, however, no one
can identify the Goldilocks sentence, and no one can know
whether plea bargaining rewards guilty pleas or penalizes
exercise of the right to trial. It is as likely to be one thing
as the other.
C. A Formalist Answer: The Law Deems Post-Trial Sentenc-
es Deserved. Although no one may know the Goldilocks
sentence or what punishment an offender deserves, one
92. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1969); accord People v.
Earegood, 162 N.W. 2d 802, 812 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968), rev'd in part, People v. Earegood,
173 N.W.2d 205 (Mich. 1970); Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial
Determination of Sentencing, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 220 (1956).
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can easily determine what punishment the law says he
deserves. This punishment is the one that sentencing au-
thorities have determined should be imposed following a
conviction at trial." Because no one is in a position to
psychoanalyze the authorities or second-guess their offi-
cial determinations, plea bargaining must be viewed as
rewarding defendants who plead guilty. The issue is one
of juridical theory, not fact.
D. One Realist Answer: Post-Trial Sentences are Imposed
Because Offenders Deserve Them, While Defendants Who
Plead Guilty are Rewarded. To judge whether plea bar-
gaining rewards defendants who plead guilty or instead
penalizes those convicted at trial, one need neither know
the Goldilocks sentence nor indulge in the fiction that
post-trial sentences must be considered deserved simply
because officials have imposed them. After examining the
actual motives of sentencing authorities, the likely mo-
tives of people in their situation, and the consequences of
their choices, one can make a plausible guess about what
punishments would be imposed in a regime without plea
bargaining. If all defendants in a system without bar-
gaining would receive the punishments now imposed on
defendants convicted at trial, plea bargaining can fairly
be said to reward those who plead guilty. These defend-
ants achieve better results in a system with plea bargain-
ing than they would in a system without it. At the same
time, defendants who stand trial would be treated identi-
cally in both systems. And in fact, an examination of the
American legal system indicates that it fits this pattern.
Current post-trial sentences reflect bona fide determina-
tions of desert and nothing else. In the absence of plea
bargaining, these sentences probably would be imposed
across the board.
E. An Opposing Realist Answer: Post-Trial Sentences are In-
flated to Discourage Exercise of the Right to Trial. As
suggested in the preceding answer (D), the appropriate
inquiry is what sentences offenders would receive in a
93. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that plea bargaining
gives defendants a opportunity "to serve less time than the law says [they] deserve [."). But
see text at notes 104-05 infra.
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system without plea bargaining. The correct response,
however, is the opposite of the one that answer (D) sup-
plies. For the most part, it is offenders who plead guilty
who receive the sentences they are thought to deserve.
The more severe sentences that follow conviction at trial
are imposed, not to punish or deter crime, but to deter ex-
ercise of the right to trial. America's penology matches
that of a Chicago trial judge who declared, "He takes
some of my time, I take some of his. That's the way it
works." 4
F. None of the Above. Please select this answer if you know
the Goldilocks sentence.
Before giving your final answer to this multiple-choice question,
consider another thought experiment. Imagine a hypothetical
democracy called Becker in which, until recently, everyone em-
braced the penal philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. Everyone in
Becker believed that the function of criminal punishment was de-
terrence and that penalties should be calculated to ensure that
crime does not pay."
Of course not every crime is detected. The people of Becker con-
cluded that penalties should be determined by multiplying the
gain an offender derived from committing his crime times the
number of crimes he could have been expected to commit before
being convicted. For several reasons, they also concluded that
judges should not impose punishments much more severe than
those provided by this calculus. First, more severe punishments
would cause offenders to suffer needlessly, and "all punishment in
itself is evil.... [I]f it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to
be admitted in as far as it promised to exclude some greater
evil."" Second, imposing punishments more severe than neces-
sary would waste public funds. And third, effective deterrence
requires grading crimes and reserving more severe penalties for
more severe crimes. If-like murderers-kidnappers, armed rob-
94. See Alschuler, supra note 78, at 1089 (describing the remark a Chicago judge made
to Dallin H. Oaks after telling Oaks that, if his client declined an offer of two-to-five years
and was convicted at trial, the judge would impose a sentence of twenty years).
95. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 169 (1968); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983).
96. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
JEREMY BENTHAM AND JOHN STuART MILL, THE UTILITARIANS 162 (1961).
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bers, and rapists were subject to capital punishment, they might
see no reason not to kill their victims.
For many years, Becker implemented its Benthamite penology
without variation. The people of Becker recently realized, howev-
er, that practical necessity required them to discourage exercise of
the right to trial. Judges then were instructed to impose more
severe sentences following convictions at trial than following pleas
of guilty. Moreover, they were told to make the difference so sub-
stantial that 95% of all offenders would plead guilty.
Social science research reveals that the new policy has been im-
plemented. With every other relevant variable held constant, the
sentences currently imposed following convictions at trial are
much more severe than those imposed following pleas of guilty,
and 95% of all convictions in Becker are by plea.
Here's the thought experiment. The judges could have complied
with Becker's new policy either by lowering the sentences of de-
fendants who pleaded guilty below the Benthamite baseline or by
increasing the sentences of defendants convicted at trial above it.
These judges are sane, smart, public-spirited people. Can you
guess which they did?
Do you suppose that the judges of Becker reduced the sentences
of defendants who pleaded guilty so that these sentences no longer
overbalanced the benefit offenders derived from committing their
crimes? Do you imagine that they-or that any polity-would cre-
ate a regime in which crime does pay for 95% of all offenders? Or
does it seem more likely that the judges of Becker still sentence
the vast majority of criminals to the punishment needed to deter
crime while imposing additional punishment on a tiny minority to
save the cost of trials?97
Becker is only one of several hypothetical jurisdictions that re-
cently rejected the judgment of the Framers of the U.S. Constitu-
tion that the cost of trials is worth paying. Each of these jurisdic-
tions now sentences defendants who are convicted at trial more
severely than those who plead guilty. The former penology of the
other hypothetical jurisdictions, however, differed from the prior
97. Odds bargaining often could lead deterrence-minded authorities to impose sentenc-
es below the Benthamite baseline; some deterrence is better than none. The issue posed by
the thought experiment, however, is how a deterrence-minded polity probably would ac-
complish the objectives of costs bargaining. Would it be more likely to impose sentences
below the Benthamite baseline in 19 cases out of 20 or to impose a sentence above the base-
line in one? Recall that lowering the baseline at all leaves crime a profitable enterprise.
Vol. 51700
Two Band-Aids
penology of Becker. Perform the same thought experiment with
them.
When an offender was convicted in Kant, judges previously im-
posed the sentence he deserved. Do you suppose that judges in
Kant now sentence 95% of all offenders less severely than they
deserve? In Greenwood, judges formerly assessed the dangerous-
ness of each offender and sentenced him to a long enough prison
term to protect the public through incapacitation. Do you suppose
the judges of Greenwood now decline to incapacitate the vast ma-
jority of offenders long enough to protect the public? In Wootton,
judges formerly required offenders to undergo the treatment they
believed the offenders needed to cure their socially harmful behav-
ior. Do you suppose these judges now require 95% of all offenders
to undergo only part of this treatment?
People devise rationalizations for their self-interested conduct.
If the changes that occurred in Becker, Kant, Greenwood, and
Wootton had happened more gradually, even the authors of these
changes might not have realized just what they were doing. These
legislatures, sentencing commissions, prosecutors, and judges
might have been unwilling to sentence most offenders less severe-
ly than they deserved or to leave crime a paying proposition. In-
stead, they might have conserved public resources by sentencing
offenders convicted at trial more severely. Officials might never-
theless proclaim (and even believe) that they never sentenced an-
yone more severely than he deserved or more than public protec-
tion required." Considering what officials would have done in a
regime without plea bargaining may offer greater insight than
asking what officials believe they are doing." Like everyone else,
criminal justice officials can convince themselves of many things.
The thought experiment you just performed may have persuad-
ed you that officials are more likely to pursue cost-saving objec-
tives by penalizing exercise of the right to trial than by sacrificing
the purposes of criminal punishment (at least in part) for 95% of
98. I have examined the claim that defendants who plead guilty deserve lighter sen-
tences than those convicted at trial in Alschuler, supra note 50, at 661-69, 718-23.
99. Economists speak of "revealed preferences." They maintain that people's prefer-
ences are shown, not by what they say, but by what they do. See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson,
Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15 ECONOMICA 243, 243 (1948); Hal
R. Varian, Revealed Preference, in SAMUELSONIAN ECONOMICS AND THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 99 (Michael Szenberg, Lall Ramrattan & Eric A. Gottesman, eds., 2006). The
thought experiment presented in text could be regarded as asking about "hypothetical
revealed preferences" or even "unrevealed revealed preferences."
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all offenders. If you remain in doubt, however, consider one more
jurisdiction, the United States of America.
The United States is more dependent on plea bargaining than
any other nation in the world. It also incarcerates a higher pro-
portion of its population than any other nation. o Could the Unit-
ed States truly have achieved the world record for mass incarcera-
tion'0' while sentencing 95% of all offenders less severely than
they deserved? Until the Lafler-Frye majority acknowledged that
post-trial sentences often were inflated to encourage guilty pleas,
the official story seemed to be that 95% of the 2,292,133 Ameri-
cans behind bars 102 had been rewarded for their pleas of guilty and
therefore sentenced less severely than they deserved (or than was
necessary to fully protect the public). Moreover, some observers,
including the Lafler-Frye dissenters, still insist that 95% of Amer-
ica's prisoners received undeserved breaks. These lucky millions
gambled and beat the house.1 3
Justice Scalia contends that at least the defendants who entered
plea agreements were sentenced less severely than the law says
they deserve.104 But what law says that the punishments they
would have received following conviction at trial are the ones they
deserved? One federal law says that all sentences must "comply
with" a list of approved purposes of punishment. These purposes
include providing just punishment for the offense. They do not
include reducing court costs or ensuring conviction in doubtful
cases.10 5 Do judges follow this statute when defendants are con-
victed at trial but not when they plead guilty? Some officials bare-
ly maintain the fiction that post-trial sentences are deserved.
100. Roy WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (2011), available at
http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-9-22.pdf ("The United States has
the highest prison population rate in the world, 743 per 100,000 of the national population,
followed by Rwanda (c. 595), Russia (568), Georgia (547), U.S. Virgin Is. (539), Seychelles
(507), St Kitts & Nevis (495), British Virgin Is. (468), Belize (439), Dominica (431), Bermu-
da (428), Grenada (423) and Curacao (422).").
101. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
102. WALMSLEY, supra note 100, at 3.
103. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Presuma-
bly 95% of the more than four million Americans under forms of penal supervision other
than imprisonment got lucky too. See Lauren E. Glaze & Erika Parks, Correctional Popula-
tions in the United States, 2011, NAT'L CRIM. J., Nov. 2012 at 1, 4 tbl. 3 available at,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics 2012).
104. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
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When Congress creates new crimes and increases sentences, it
speaks, not of doing justice, but of giving "tools" to prosecutors.o
Consider mandatory minimum sentences like the ones 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) provides for drug traffickers carrying firearms:
In a recent case, a twenty-two-year-old defendant was arrest-
ed on two occasions for possessing both drugs and a firearm.
Although he had no criminal record before these arrests, his
conviction of the second offense required the court to impose a
mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years, which the
offender would be required to serve after he completed his
first sentence. When Judge Myron H. Thompson imposed the
total sentence of forty years required by section 924 . . . , he
called this sentence "draconian." He noted that not only
would the offender's child grow up without a father but his
grandchildren, if he had any, would be teenagers or young
adults before he was released.
Judge Thompson and other judges are required to impose the
mandatory minimum sentences specified by section 924, but
prosecutors have a choice. The [United States] Sentencing
Commission reports that, after the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in charging and plea bargaining, only 20% of the of-
fenders who used firearms to commit drug crimes received the
mandatory sentences that section 924 prescribes, and offend-
ers who carried firearms without using them received the sec-
tion 924 enhancements even less often. 107
106. The full title of the PROTECT Act is the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650
(2003). The full title of the USA Patriot Act is the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. See
Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Shortly after the Supreme Court narrowly construed
a federal statute proscribing schemes to "deprive another of the intangible right to honest
services," see 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006), a Senate committee held hearings titled, "Restoring
Key Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption After the Supreme Court's Skilling Decision."
See Restoring Key Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption After the Supreme Court's Skil-
ling Decision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010). No one in
Congress speaks of providing "tools" to defense attorneys.
107. Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 115-16 (2005) (describing Judge Thompson's opinion in
United States v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ala. 2004), and some findings
reported in UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 90 (2004)).
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If mandatory minimum sentences reflect Congress's determina-
tion of the punishments offenders deserve, why don't they bind the
officials who determine sentences? Why are they imposed in only
one case out of five?
Was Congress unaware that prosecutors effectively determine
sentences in 95% of the cases? Or did Congress willingly play the
bad cop, threatening the accused with harsh treatment? Did it
knowingly invite prosecutors to play the good cop? Did it supply
weaponry that it expected to be brandished in every case but fired
only rarely?
At the very least, a regime of plea bargaining enables legislators
to indulge in vengeful fantasies and political posturing, secure in
the knowledge that no one will pay the fiscal and human costs of
implementing these fantasies across the board. When a legisla-
ture plans from the outset to allow 95% of all offenders to avoid
the punishments it prescribes, these punishments do not establish
a moral norm.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1957, in Shelton v. United States,'o a panel of the Fifth Cir-
c'uit held plea bargaining unlawful by a vote of two to one. "Jus-
tice and liberty are not the subjects of bargaining and barter,"
Judge Richard Rives declared.' 9 The en banc Fifth Circuit set
aside the panel ruling by a vote of three to two,"o and the defend-
ant sought review in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court did not decide in Shelton whether a guilty
plea was involuntary simply because a prosecutor had induced it
by promising leniency. The Court would not resolve that question
until twelve years later."' Instead, in 1958, the Solicitor General
confessed error on a tangential issue, and the Court accepted his
confession." 2
The government's confession of error was peculiar. While refer-
ring to all the circumstances of the case, it emphasized that the
trial court had failed to conduct an adequate inquiry when it ac-
cepted the defendant's guilty plea. The confession of error, how-
108. 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir.), judgment set aside en banc, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957),
rev'd per curiam, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
109. Id. at 113.
110. Sheldon v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 356 U.S.
26 (1958).
111. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
112. Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
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ever, failed even to advert to the Fifth Circuit's ruling on this is-
sue. The Fifth Circuit had held unanimously that an inadequate
inquiry would not entitle the defendant to withdraw his plea but
would require only a hearing on the plea's validity.113 Perhaps the
Solicitor General did some vote counting, feared that the Supreme
Court would forbid plea bargaining, and sought to foreclose such a
ruling.114
If the Supreme Court had outlawed plea bargaining in 1958, I
do not believe that the sky would have fallen. I also believe the
American criminal justice system would look very different today.
I cannot demonstrate that plea bargaining has been at the root of
the many evils that have befallen this system since 1958, but one
can make a plausible case that it prompted or facilitated most of
them. By lowering the price of imposing criminal punishment,
plea bargaining gave America more of it.11s
Here are a few more thought experiments. If the Supreme
Court had outlawed plea bargaining in 1958, would the United
States now have as many mandatory minimum sentences, and
would they be as harsh? Would it have approved mandatory sen-
tencing guidelines (guidelines the Supreme Court later made ad-
visory)?"1 Would it have ended parole?... Would it have rushed to
punish crack cocaine offenses by treating a single gram of this
drug as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder?1 ' Would it have
locked up non-violent white-collar first offenders for decades, cal-
113. See Shelton, 242 F.2d at 112 (panel opinion); Shelton, 246 F.2d at 572-73 (en banc
opinion).
114. The Solicitor General's confession of error does not appear in most collections of
Supreme Court briefs and records. In 1968, however, I located a copy in the Supreme Court
library. I told the Shelton story in Alschuler, supra note 10, at 35-37.
115. The prosecutors and judges who produce convictions and sentences in America are
usually officials of one set of govermnents (counties) while prison costs are largely borne by
another set of governments (states). Through plea bargaining, courts and prosecutors issue
punishment orders cheaply while someone else pays the cost of filling these orders. Far
from reducing what taxpayers pay for criminal justice, plea bargaining almost certainly has
caused them to pay more.
116. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); cf United States v. Green, 346 F.
Supp. 2d 259, 270 (D. Mass 2004) ("Enhanced plea bargaining is actually the goal of the
[federal sentencing] guidelines.").
117. Defendants cannot bargain with a parole board. Leaving much of the determina-
tion of sentence to a parole board makes it difficult for prosecutors to promise significant
sentence reductions to defendants who will be sentenced to prison following their guilty
pleas. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
IN AMERICA 186-94 (2003).
118. See William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sen-
tencing Policy, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1250-56 (1996); David A. Slansky, Cocaine, Race, and
Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1290-98 (1995).
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culating their sentences by counting the dollars their crimes
cost' 9- and possessors of child pornography for a decade or more,
calculating their sentences by counting the unlawful images on
their computers? 20 Would it have taken "real offense sentencing"
to the same nonsensical extremes?'21 Would it have six-month
trials? Would it conduct lengthy hearings on the appropriate
phrasing of Miranda warnings and other irrelevancies?122 Would
it have approved RICO, the PROTECT Act, the "honest services"
statute, and other swaggering tough-on-crime measures?
In a series of articles that began forty-five years ago, I argued
that the United States should prohibit plea bargaining'2 3 and that
doing so was feasible.12 4 Now, however, the criminal justice sys-
tem has gone off the tracks, and the rails themselves have disap-
peared. If someone were to propose a Tea Party (or Back to Ba-
sics) Movement for Criminal Justice, I might still join,125 but I
would not give the group more than ten dollars. The time for a
crusade to prohibit plea bargaining has passed.126
119. See Peter J. Henning, Sentences Get Harsher in White-Collar Cases, N.Y. TIMES
DEALB%K (Apr. 12, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/sentences-get-harsher-
in-white-collar-cases/.
120. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 13, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/DataandStatistics/AnnualReportsandSourcebooks/2010/Tablel3.
pdf (reporting that the average federal sentence for child pornography in fiscal 2010 was
118 months); John Gabriel Woodlee, Note, Congressional Manipulation of the Sentencing
Guideline for Child Pornography Possession: An Argument for or Against Deference?, 60
DUKE L.J. 1015, 1025-31 (2011); Rachel Aviv, The Science of Sex Abuse: Is it Right to Im-
prison People for Heinous Crimes They Have Not Yet Committed?, The New Yorker, Jan. 14,
2013, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/01/14/130114fa fact_aviv?currentPage=1.
121. See Alschuler, supra note 107, at 94-95 (noting that federal courts now sentence
low-level drug dealers on the basis of the weight of all the drugs possessed by all the mem-
ber of their drug organizations and even on the basis of drugs these dealers were acquitted
of possessing).
122. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519 (2008).
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124. See Alschuler, supra note 83.
125. I say that as someone who is appalled by the actual Tea Party's influence on Ameri-
can politics.
126. As late as 1965, a federal court of appeals declared, "It is clear, of course, that a
plea of guilty induced by a promise of lenient treatment is an involuntary plea and hence
void." Scott v. United States, 349 F.2d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1965). The proposition asserted
by the court was far from clear in 1965, but the fact that a court could make this confident
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1978." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, A
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Two Band-Aids
Instead, the time may have come for criminal justice scholars to
abandon the search for ways to make the criminal justice system
fair and principled. Their principal mission today should be to
make it less awful. Improving the plea bargaining process should
be one of their goals. The decisions in Lafler and Frye take a tiny
step in that direction, and the articles published in this symposi-
um point to larger steps-recording plea offers, amending the
rules that prohibit judges from participating in plea negotiation,
and ensuring that Brady disclosures and other discovery occur at
the time the process begins or at least before it ends.127
Beyond improving the plea bargaining process, scholars should
ask of every proposed reform whether approving it would make
trials more or less available. They should seek ways to simplify
trial, pretrial, and post-trial procedures. They should resist over-
criminalization (especially the expansion of federal criminal law).
They should oppose severe punishments. They should support
greater funding for indigent defense and seek more effective ways
of supplying it.128 They should embrace Professor Bibas's proposal
for sentencing juries empowered to accept or reject plea agree-
ments.129 They should cheer most measures that would reduce the
bargaining leverage of prosecutors while booing most measures
that would enhance it. Most of all, they should not allow what is
familiar to become what is right.
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sell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining after Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REv. 595 (2013).
128. See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance
after Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013).
129. See BIBAS, supra note 41, at 156-64.
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